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A STATE’S POWER TO ENTER INTO A CONSENT DECREE THAT VIOLATES 
STATE LAW PROVISIONS: What “findings” of a federal violation are sufficient to 
justify a consent decree that trumps state law?
David W. Swift1
In the last forty years federal courts have played a prominent role in reshaping our public 
institutions.  From school desegregation to prisoners rights, institutional reform in the shape of 
court judgments have become commonplace.2  While some scholars question the efficacy of 
these structural injunctions, arguing that legislative prerogative should not be usurped by 
judicially mandated budgetary priorities, the authority of federal courts to order such remedies is 
generally unquestioned.3  This authority arises out of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which requires a state to do what is constitutionally commanded, despite any 
resulting violation of state law.  As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[t]hat compliance 
with a decree enforcing federal law will have an ancillary effect on the state treasury is the 
inevitable and permissible consequence of Ex parte Young – type suits.”4
With this uncontroversial premise in mind, we now turn to an emerging and more 
controversial offshoot of judicially mandated structural reform, the use of settlement and consent 
decrees in bringing about such reform.  A consent decree is a judicially approved settlement 
agreement that is based on an agreement between the parties and yet has the force and effect of a 
final judgment.  Because of this dual nature, consent decrees have elements of both contracts and 
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2judicial orders.5  As the Supreme Court noted, a consent decree embodies the agreement of the 
parties and is enforceable as, “a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to 
other judgments and decrees.”6  A federal consent decree “must spring from, and serve to 
resolve, a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; must come within the general 
scope of the case made by the pleadings; and must further the objectives of the law upon which 
the complaint was based.”7  Nothing controversial yet.  
What is controversial, and what is the subject of this article, is whether state officials can 
agree to a remedy they would not have had the authority to order themselves; and if so, to what 
extent must an underlying constitutional violation be proved so as to justify the remedy.  To 
understand the issue, let us look at an example.  We’ll begin with the imaginary U.S. state of 
Transylvania, and its attorney general, Count Dracula.  Transylvanians, it turns out, are 
proponents of small government and many years ago they enacted an amendment into their state 
constitution that requires all spending increases in the state budget to be approved by two-thirds 
of the Transylvania state assembly.  Because of this spending cap, Transylvania has always had 
only one prison.  As the years went on, the prison grew more and more crowded, until one day a 
group of prisoners brought suit in federal court alleging that the overcrowding was so bad that it 
resulted in a violation of their federal constitutionally guaranteed right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment.  After a long and bitter legal battle with both sides incurring hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in legal fees, the federal court agreed with the prisoners’ allegations and 
ordered the state of Transylvania to build a new prison to resolve the overcrowding at a cost of 
twenty million dollars.  Moreover the court ordered the state of Transylvania to pay the 
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3plaintiffs’ hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees, a not uncommon remedy in such suits.8
Let us assume that the remedy was necessary to cure the overcrowding and that it met all the 
requirements of a federal injunction.  Clearly then, the fact that the judgment would cause the 
state to spend its funds to build the new prison cannot void the federal judgment.  Because of the 
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, we know that a state law cannot prevent a federal 
court ordered remedy that is necessary to cure a constitutional violation. 
Let us take this same example, except this time, Count Dracula, relying on his years of 
experience, realized that there was a good chance the state was going to lose the lawsuit.  
Therefore, Count Dracula, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of Transylvania, began 
settlement negotiations with the prisoners instead of fighting the intense legal battle in the federal 
courts and risking an adverse judgment.  After negotiations, the prisoners and Count Dracula 
entered into a settlement agreement stating that the state would build a new facility at the cost of 
ten million dollars that the prisoners agreed would alleviate the alleged constitutional violations.  
The parties submitted their agreement to the federal court, which approved the settlement as fair 
and entered it as a judgment.  Furious at the spending increase that directly violated the 
Transylvania state constitution, Mr. and Mrs. Vampire sued the state in their capacity as 
taxpayers, arguing that Count Dracula did not have the authority to enter into such an agreement.  
They argued that only the state legislature, by a two-thirds vote, could increase state spending on 
prisons and that Count Dracula had no authority to circumvent the normal procedures.  
Moreover, their argument went, even if a federal court could order such a remedy upon a finding 
of a constitutional violation, there was no such finding in this case because the lawsuit settled 
prior to a finding on the underlying constitutional violation.  
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Dracula could not have entered into a private contract with a group of prisoners to build a new 
prison in violation of the state’s spending laws.  The power to increase spending to build a new 
prison would have belonged to the state legislature alone.  But a consent decree is more than a 
private contract, and federal courts are more than recorders of contracts, so surely the federal 
court stamp of approval must produce some additional rights. 
There are three views that seem to emerge from the reasoning underlying the cases 
regarding the authority of state actors to consent to settlements that result in structural reform 
consent decrees.  First, is the view that a state (or state actor) never has the authority to agree to a 
settlement that they wouldn’t have the power to bring about on their own.  This view relies 
heavily on contract analysis and the notion that a contract is valid if and only if both parties had 
the authority to assent.  For example, a contract to pay a sum of money to take public office is 
not a valid contract because neither party has the power to put another in public office – that 
right belongs to the voters and the voters only.  In much the same way, Count Dracula’s contract 
to build a prison by spending ten million dollars would be invalid because the right to spend state 
funds does not belong to the count and instead rests with a two-thirds majority of the state 
assembly.  As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[w]hen the parties to a decree seek to 
enlarge their legal entitlements – to grant themselves rights and powers that they could not 
achieve outside of court – their agreement is not enough.”9  As it relates to public law remedies, 
another Seventh Circuit panel recently observed that although possibly inefficient, “some rules 
of law are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders, to make them return to other 
branches of government or to the voters for permission to engage in certain acts.  They may 
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5chafe at these restraints and seek to evade them, but they may not do so by agreeing to do 
something that state law forbids.”10
A second view, based on the general policy of encouraging settlements, is that such an 
agreement is valid so long as the court had jurisdiction to order the relief and each party 
consented.  The main importance of this view is that a court is not required to look into the 
merits of the claim upon which the consent decree is based.  A district court in New Jersey 
recently upheld a consent decree as valid, noting that, “[j]ursidiction existed if plaintiff’s federal 
claims were colorable, and if the relief was fairly designed to cure the constitutional 
violations.”11  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also echoed this sentiment, holding that 
“[t]he trial court in approving a settlement need not inquire into the precise legal rights of the 
parties nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy, but need only determine 
that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and appropriate under the particular facts and 
that there has been valid consent by the concerned parties.”12  First, settlements “contribute 
greatly to the efficient utilization of scarce judicial resources.”13  Second, the policy of 
encouraging settlements is especially persuasive in structural reform cases where often 
“voluntary compliance by the parties over an extended period will contribute significantly 
toward ultimate achievement of statutory goals.”14  This view also focuses on the broad authority 
of the state attorney general, who, as the chief legal counsel of the state, possesses the power to 
direct the legal affairs of the state as the public interest requires.  Absent any state provision 
limiting the attorney general’s authority, the power to settle must be one of the legal tools 
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6available to him.   Moreover, a consent decree has no force until it is officially approved by the 
court and entered as a judgment.  This process of court approval, which includes a hearing to 
determine the fairness of the proposed consent decree, provides an ample check on potential bad 
faith attempts to circumvent state law. 
In between the first two views is a third view that allows a federal court to approve a 
consent decree which violates state law only upon properly supported findings that such a 
remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law.15  Under this view, a remedy that would 
violate state law “may not be based on consent alone; it depends on the exercise of a federal 
power, which in turn depends on a violation of federal law.”16  Depending on how one defines 
“properly supported findings of a violation,” this view begins to look much like either of the 
previous two views.  If a properly supported finding means a formal federal court determination 
on the merits of the underlying violation, then this view looks very much like view I, where a 
state attorney general has no power to settle and instead must litigate all lawsuits aimed at 
obtaining a structural reform remedy.  It seems to make little sense to argue that view I is wrong 
and that a state attorney general has the power to settle in a structural reform case, and yet 
suggest that that attorney general can only settle after having lost the lawsuit he couldn’t settle 
until he had lost.  On the other hand, if a properly supported finding consists of nothing more 
than a statement in the proposed decree that says something to the effect of “both parties agree 
there is a reasonable factual and legal basis to support plaintiff’s allegations,”17 then it is hard to
see how this view is any different than view II, which would give the state attorney general broad 
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7powers to settle lawsuits in the interest of the state so long as the underlying claim in not 
completely bogus.  
It is my goal to demonstrate that view III is correct, and further, to suggest a workable 
standard for determining what constitutes a sufficient finding of a violation for consent decree 
purposes.  Let us begin by analyzing the problems with view I, which, although appealing for its 
logical simplicity, cannot stand.  Yet despite being explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in 
199718, it continues to find support in the lower courts to this day.19  In fact, the Ninth Circuit 
recently relied on the logic of view I to vacate a consent decree between Southern California 
Edison and the Commissioners of the California Public Utilities Commission that appeared to 
violate California state law.20  As if almost quoting from view I, the Ninth Circuit noted that “as 
a matter of federal law, state officials cannot enter into a federally-sanctioned consent decree 
beyond their authority under state law.”21  To support this proposition, the court cited two 
previous Ninth Circuit cases as follows:
See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(consent decree could not be interpreted to supplant 
California Outdoor Advertising Act because state agency 
would not have had authority to agree to such a decree); 
Wash. v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(vacating a consent decree that required the state of Oregon 
to fund a prisoners’ legal services program because the 
state Attorney General acted beyond his authority and 
therefore the consent decree was void to the extent that it 
exceeded defendants’ authority).22
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8However neither case stands for these propositions.  In Keith v. Volpe, the Ninth Circuit 
vacated a consent decree between an environmental group and the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) that prohibited advertising displays along a state freeway because it 
conflicted with a state law regulating outdoor advertising.  However, the court did not void the 
consent decree because Caltrans lacked the authority to agree to such a decree, but rather because 
there was no violation of federal law to justify superseding state law.  The court specifically 
noted that “[u]nder the Constitution, the district court could not supersede California’s law unless 
it conflicts with any federal law,” and the court approving the consent decree, “failed to identify 
a single federal law that would justify its overriding state law.”23  Looking closely at the holding 
of Keith, we can see that it does not support view I.  Keith says nothing regarding the authority of 
state agencies to enter into a consent decree based on an alleged violation of federal law.  Rather, 
Keith stands for the proposition that when a consent decree violates or supersedes state law, there 
must be a federal law justifying the intrusion.  If that holding sounds familiar, it should, because 
it borrows directly from the logic of view III.  View III, we remember, argued that such a 
consent decree must be based upon properly supported findings necessary to rectify a violation 
of federal law.  Keith does not discuss what findings would be necessary to uphold the decree, 
noting only that in this case there were no such findings because there was no violation of federal 
law.
Washington v. Penwell is probably the case cited most often as supporting view I; yet, 
this is far from the actual holding.  In Penwell, a group of indigent Oregon prisoners sued state 
officials alleging that inadequate legal facilities denied their constitutional right of access to the 
courts.  The district court entered a consent decree requiring accessible prison law libraries and 
trained prisoner paralegals.  A second consent decree clarified these programs and included 
23
 See Kieth, 118 F.3d at 1393, and Southern California Edison, 307 F.3d at 809.
9certain funding requirements.  A few years later, the state of Oregon sought to escape its 
obligations under the consent decree and therefore sued to have the decree vacated.  The district 
court vacated the consent decree, holding that “defendants and their counsel, the Oregon 
Attorney General, lacked the power to bind the state to this financial undertaking,”24 because the 
“perpetual obligation to fund legal services violates state law.”25  Specifically, the decree 
violated Oregon’s Constitution, which prohibits the state from incurring more than $50,000 in 
debt.26  Moreover, “executive officials such as defendants are forbidden to exercise legislative 
functions, including the making of appropriations, which are vested in the state assembly.”27
While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, it implicitly rejected much of the 
district court’s reasoning.  The Ninth Circuit vacated the consent decree because, “defendants 
agreed to do more than constitutionally required.”28  The court noted that the “district court could 
not have entered an involuntary decree requiring state officials to do more than the minimum 
needed to conform with federal law.”29  Assuming the court is correct in that a federal court only 
has the power to require state officials to do the minimum necessary to conform with federal 
law,30 it follows that the same state officials could not agree to do more through a consent 
decree.  With this in mind, all Penwell holds is that state officials can’t consent to an agreement 
that would do more to remedy the violation than the federal court could have ordered on its own.  
By focusing on the remedy the court could have ordered, Penwell implicitly recognizes the right 
24
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of state officials to enter into a consent decree so long as such a remedy could have been ordered 
by the court.  In fact, the court noted that “[i]f general legal services for prisoners were required 
by the Constitution, we might be able to enforce this provision, notwithstanding the state’s 
protest.  It would be a method of meeting constitutional standards, and one formulated by the 
officials charged with penal supervision.”31  Much as was the situation in Keith, the logic of 
Penwell sounds much like view III, which would uphold such a consent decree that violated state 
law only upon properly supported findings that such a decree is necessary to rectify a violation of 
federal law.  In Penwell, the court vacated the decree because the remedy it produced was not 
necessary to rectify a violation of federal law, not because the state attorney general exceeded his 
authority by agreeing to a consent decree that violated the Oregon state constitution.32
In 1997, in Lawyer v. Department of Justice, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 
5-4 decision, upheld a consent decree that redrew Florida’s legislative districts based on a 
lawsuit challenging the original districts as unconstitutional.  While we will discuss this case in 
greater detail when we discuss the sort of finding of a violation of federal law that justifies a 
consent decree violating state law, at this point it is worth noting that the court upheld the 
consent decree despite the fact it likely violated the Florida state constitution and despite the fact 
that the parties could not have agreed to the settlement outside of litigation.  Moreover, Justice 
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suppose that the State’s attorney general lacked the authority to propose a plan as an incident of 
his authority to represent the state in this litigation.”33
Much like view I, view II is similarly incorrect.  While it is true that a state law cannot 
prevent a remedy necessary to cure a federal constitutional or statutory violation, this does not 
mean that a state can always disregard a valid state law through a consent decree.  The power to 
supersede valid state laws arises from the supremacy clause, meaning that, “an alteration of the 
statutory scheme may not be based on consent alone; it depends on an exercise of federal power, 
which in turn depends on a violation of federal law.”34  While we will discuss whether a formal 
“violation” of federal law must be shown shortly, at this point it is clear that it is from this notion 
of a federal violation that the power to disregard state law springs.  Without this power arising 
from the supremacy clause, a state is powerless to ignore binding state laws.
There are two cases which could be seen as supporting view II, Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation v. Village of Arlington Heights35, and Lawyer v. Department of 
Justice36, because both cases uphold consent decrees that violated state law without a formal 
finding of a constitutional violation.  However, both cases are more appropriately read as 
supporting view III, because although neither case contained a formal finding of a constitutional 
violation, both courts found at least a substantial evidentiary and legal basis for the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
In Village of Arlington Heights, the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 
sued the Village of Arlington Heights arguing that its failure to rezone fifteen acres for multi-
33
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family use was racially discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution and the Fair Housing Act.  After the trial, the district court held for the defendant-
village.  The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the effect of the refusal to rezone was 
discriminatory and violated the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that discriminatory intent must be shown to establish a 14th
amendment violation and that no such intent could be inferred from the record.  The case was 
remanded to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether there was a violation of the Fair Housing 
Act.  On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that under the Fair Housing Act the defendant-village 
had an obligation to refrain from exclusionary zoning and remanded the case to the district court 
with directions to require the village to identify a parcel of land within its boundaries that was 
properly zoned and suitable for low-income housing or be found in violation of the Fair Housing 
Act.  Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to a settlement and provided the district court with a 
consent decree that indisputably circumvented normal statutory procedures in connection with 
the annexation of land.   The district court allowed three different groups to intervene and after 
three days of hearings, approved the consent decree and entered it as judgment.  The intervenors 
appealed, but the Seventh Circuit upheld the decree and the Supreme Court refused to hear the 
matter.  
While the Seventh Circuit used broad language in upholding the decree, that language 
must be read in the context of the five-year litigation history of this lawsuit.  On the one hand, 
the court stated that “[t]he trial court in approving a settlement need not inquire into the precise 
legal rights of the parties nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy.”37  On 
the other hand, the court noted that the “trial judge fulfilled his responsibilities in determining 
that the settlement embodied in the consent decree was fair, adequate, reasonable and 
37
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appropriate, and his opinion shows how carefully he analyzed the facts of the case in relation to 
the relevant principles of applicable law.”  Moreover, while there was no “formal” finding of a 
constitutional violation, the Seventh Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, held that the 
defendant-village “has a standing obligation under the Fair Housing Act to refrain from 
perpetuation of zoning policies that effectively foreclose construction of low-cost housing.”38
The court further instructed the district court that if the village could not identify a parcel of land 
within its boundaries which is both properly zoned and suitable for low cost housing, “the district 
court should conclude that the Village’s failure to rezone effectively precluded plaintiffs from 
constructing low cost housing within Arlington Heights, and should grand plaintiffs the relief 
they seek.”39  While this may not constitute a “formal” finding of a federal statutory violation, it 
clearly is a prima facie finding of a violation as it serves to shift the burden to the defendants to 
prove that no violation of the Fair Housing Act had occurred.  
In much the same way, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawyer is also better read as 
supporting view III rather than view II.  In Lawyer, plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court 
against the state of Florida challenging the configuration of a Florida legislative district under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  After a failed mediation attempt, the parties (with the exception of one 
of the plaintiffs) filed a proposed settlement agreement with the district court that addressed the 
alleged unconstitutionality by redrawing the legislative districts.  “The agreement noted that 
while defendants and defendant-intervenors denied the plaintiffs’ claims that District 21 was 
unconstitutional, all parties to the settlement concurred that there is a reasonable factual and legal 
basis for the plaintiffs’ claim.”40
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After a fairness hearing, the district court entered the consent decree despite the fact that 
the remedy potentially violated the Florida Constitution, which seems to provide exclusive 
means through which redistricting can take place.41  The district court held that it was not 
obligated to find the existing District 21 unconstitutional in order to approve the consent decree.  
“While recognizing the need to guard against any disingenuous adventures by litigants, the 
majority noted that a State should not be deprived of the opportunity to avoid an expensive and 
protracted contest and the possibility of an adverse and disruptive adjudication by a rule insisting 
on a public mea culpa as the sole condition for dispensing with a dispositive specific 
determination of the controlling constitutional issue.”42  Before approving the settlement, the 
district court, “required a showing of a substantial evidentiary and legal basis for the plaintiffs’ 
claim … and it held the standard satisfied.”43  Moreover, “[e]ach party either states 
unequivocally that existing District 21 is unconstitutionally configured, or concedes, for 
purposes of settlement, that the plaintiffs have established prima facie unconstitutionality.”44
One judge concurred, arguing that the consent decree could not be approved without a judicial 
determination that the original plan was unconstitutional, as he concluded it was.  
The Supreme Court, in a 5- 4 decision, affirmed the district court and explicitly rejected 
the appellants’ argument that the district court erred in approving the consent decree without 
formally holding the original plan unconstitutional.   The Court noted that the State of Florida, 
41
 In FN 4, the Supreme Court argues that allowing the state attorney general to redraw the legislative districts in 
response to this lawsuit might not have expressly violated the Florida State Constitution.  Instead, the majority 
focused on the broad power of the attorney general to represent the state in litigation.  The court cited Ervin v. 
Collins, 85 So.2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1956) for the proposition that “under Florida law, the Attorney General as the chief 
law officer of the state and absent express legislative restriction to the contrary, may exercise his power and 
authority in the premises [the power to litigate] as the public interest may require.” (internal quotations omitted).  
The dissent argued that Article III, § 16 of the Florida Constitution provides exclusive means by which redistricting 
can take place.  
42






through its attorney general, elected to enter into the settlement, and that there were no reasons 
“to burden [the state’s] exercise of choice by requiring a formal adjudication of 
unconstitutionality.”45  In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy and Thomas, wrote that “the District Court lacked the authority to mandate redistricting 
without first having found a constitutional violation.”46
Rather than supporting view II because the court upholds consent decrees without 
requiring a formal finding of a federal statutory or constitutional violation, both Village of 
Arlington Heights and Lawyer are more appropriately read as supporting view III because both 
cases contain substantial findings of federal violations.  It is from these findings of a federal 
violation that the power to disregard state law springs.  Moreover, both the majority and the 
dissent in Lawyer seem to advocate for view III; the only difference is that the dissenting justices 
would narrowly define the necessary predicate violation to include only a formal finding of a 
federal violation.
If, as I have argued, view I (state actor can never enter into consent decree that orders a 
remedy the state actor could not have brought about on his or her own) is incorrect, and view II 
(state actor has extremely broad powers to settle regardless of any federal statutory or 
constitutional violation) is likewise faulty, the correct view must lie somewhere in between.  In 
other words, the power of a federal court to enter a consent decree must be dependent on some 
variable not considered in views I and II.  View III takes this middle road, making the power of a 
federal court to enter a consent decree that violates state law dependent upon a finding that the 
remedy decreed is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law.  “An alteration of the statutory 
45
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scheme may not be based on consent alone; it depends on an exercise of federal power, which in 
turn depends on a violation of federal law.”47
While the logic of view III is quite sound, it is of little practical assistance until we define 
the “finding” of a “violation” of federal law necessary to allow a federal court ordered consent 
decree to trump state law.  We know from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawyer, and the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Arlington Heights that a formal finding of a constitutional or 
statutory violation is not necessary to uphold the entry of a consent decree which supersedes 
state law; however, we also know that some finding of a violation is necessary because only 
from this notion of a federal violation does the supremacy clause allow the parties to disregard 
valid state laws.  
In People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, and in Perkins v. City of Chicago 
Heights, the Seventh Circuit utilized on the logic of view III to vacate two separate consent 
decrees because they lacked the necessary predicate finding of a constitutional violation.48  In 
Rockford a group of minority students sued the school board for intentional racial discrimination.  
The parties settled and the district court approved a consent decree that, among other things, 
overrode much of the collective bargaining agreement between the school board and the teachers 
union.  The teachers union intervened and the district court held what it called a “necessity 
hearing” to consider the union’s objections.  The district judge took evidence and concluded that 
“a sufficient factual predicate exists to support the [School] District’s decision to enter into the 
consent decree.”49  The district judge “found the decree necessary to curtail racial imbalance 
47
 Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d at 216.
48
 People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1992); Perkins v. City of Chicago 
Heights, 47 F.3d 212 (7th Cir. 1994).  
49
 Rockford, 961 F.2d at 1337 (internal quotations omitted).  
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(and the alteration of seniority necessary to carry out the decree) but not that racial imbalance 
violates any rule of law.”50  In fact, as the Seventh Circuit noted, it is clear that, “racial 
imbalance does not offend any federal norm.”51
The Seventh Circuit vacated the consent decree, holding that a remedy “is justifiable only 
insofar as it advances the ultimate objective of alleviating the initial constitutional violation.”52
Judge Easterbrook, writing for an unanimous panel, began his analysis by noting that 
“[r]emedies for violations of the Constitution may include altering statutory or contractual rules 
for assigning teachers to schools.”  The question then became whether proof of a violation is 
“essential to the adoption of a remedy that affects third parties?”  In pure dicta, Judge 
Easterbrook discussed the practical implications of this question:
Suppose that the violation were obvious—that Rockford had laws 
requiring segregation, or that its Board routinely drew school 
boundaries grouping pupils by race.  Would it be necessary to 
adjudicate the obvious before adopting (or permitting the parties to 
agree on) a remedy that altered the assignment of teachers?  It is not 
wholly satisfactory to say that if the violation is clear, the litigation will 
be swift and cheap; legal processes create opportunities for reluctant 
parties to postpone the day of reckoning.  “Consent” that is no more 
than knuckling under to the inevitable is more like adjudication than a 
contract. … A “necessity” hearing then would be a cousin to a hearing 
leading to a preliminary injunction.  The court would examine the 
evidence quickly, and if it found that victory for the plaintiffs was 
probable could approve a settlement reflecting the probable outcome of 
a contest.  If a court may order preliminary relief without fully 
adjudicating the merits, may it not sometimes order relief on a 
combination of the parties’ assent plus a review of the merits?53
50
 Id at 1338.
51
 Id. citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).  
52




The court did not answer these questions, however, holding that regardless of what sort of 
findings would be sufficient, in the present case “the district judge made no such findings.”54
Therefore, the court vacated the consent decree, holding that “before altering the contractual (or 
state-law) entitlements of third parties, the court must find the change necessary to an 
appropriate remedy for a legal wrong.”55  The court went on note that “even if this finding may 
come on abbreviated proceedings (a subject we have not yet decided), there must be such a 
finding.”56
Two years later, in Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, the Seventh Circuit, and 
specifically Judge Easterbrook, had an opportunity to address the possible sufficiency of 
abbreviated findings discussed as dicta in Rockford.  Instead, Judge Flaum, writing for a 
unanimous panel that included Judge Easterbrook, vacated the decree, holding only that the 
district judge’s “generalized statements do not constitute sufficient findings of a violation of 
federal law and cannot adequately form the basis for the modifications of the Illinois statutory 
forms of government.”57  In Perkins, a class action lawsuit alleged that Chicago Heights’ non-
partisan, at-large district wide elections used to elect representatives to the Chicago Heights City 
Council violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting the opportunity of African-American 
voters to elect representatives of their choice.  All parties moved for summary judgment, and 
while the district judge entered summary judgment for the class on certain issues, the court did 
not enter a finding of liability against the defendants, instead finding that genuine issues of 
material fact still existed precluding any finding of liability.   The parties then agreed to a 
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form of government from a “managerial form of municipal government to a “strong mayor form 
of municipal government.”  The district judge approved the parties’ consent agreement and 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment order.
Two of the named plaintiffs objected to the settlement and moved to have the consent 
decree declared invalid.  The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, but on appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the consent decree because “the parties did not have the ability to 
consent to the modifications contained in the consent decree.”58  Consistent with view III, the 
court noted that “[o]nce a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory violation … a state 
law cannot prevent a necessary remedy…. To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the 
obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that 
the Constitution imposes on them.”59  However, in the present case, the court held that there 
were no findings of a violation to justify overriding the Illinois Constitution, which contained 
exclusive provisions for changing a city’s form of government.60  Interestingly, Judge 
Easterbrook, who joined the unanimous majority, did not use this case to discuss upholding a 
consent decree based on abbreviated findings.  Instead, the court held that there was not a 
sufficient finding of a violation, despite the fact that the district court found that the consent 
decree was “supported by a significant basis in evidence and law, and… narrowly tailored to 
achieve a necessary remedy.”61
As a practical matter, litigants wary of future attacks on their consent decree should 
attempt to show prima facie unconstitutionality, or at least a substantial legal and evidentiary 
basis for the plaintiffs’ claims, coupled with a concession by all parties of prima facie
58




 Id. citing Ill. Const. Art. VII, §6(f) (stating that such modifications must be accomplished through referendum).
61
 Id. at 217.
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unconstitutionality.  On the one hand, we have City of Arlington Heights, which upheld a consent 
decree based upon a finding of a prima facie violation, and Lawyer, which upheld a consent 
decree after a showing of a “substantial evidentiary and legal basis” for plaintiffs’ claims and a 
conceded prima facie unconstitutionality by the defendants.  On the other hand, we have 
Rockford, where the court vacated the consent decree because there was no finding whatsoever 
of a violation, and Perkins, where the consent decree was vacated because the district court’s 
findings were considered too generalized and therefore insufficient.62  While uncertainty and 
lack of notice will likely cause structural reform cases to be over-litigated because the parties 
will be hesitant to risk having their settlement invalidated, litigants considering entering into a 
proposed consent decree should avoid the pitfalls of Rockford and Perkins and instead attempt to 
replicate findings such as those contained in Lawyer.    
As a policy matter, the courts should adopt a formal procedure for approving a consent 
decree that trumps state law, which clearly defines the requisite “finding” of a federal violation.  
Judge Easterbrook, although disappointingly silent in Perkins, had it right when he suggested in 
Rockford that the trial court should “examine the evidence quickly, and if it found that victory 
for the plaintiffs was probable could approve a settlement reflecting the probable outcome of a 
contest.”  This is consistent both with the logic of view III and with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawyer, where the district court’s finding of a “substantial evidentiary and legal basis
for the plaintiffs’ claim,” was considered sufficient.  A formal adoption of Judge Easterbrook’s 
preliminary injunction standard for approving a consent decree would greatly serve the public 
interest by reducing the uncertainty surrounding structural reform litigation.  A reduction in 
uncertainty would serve to minimize the waste of valuable resources by reducing the number of 
62
 The value of Perkins is likely limited to the extent its holding is inconsistent with Lawyer where the Supreme 
Court upheld a consent decree based on the district court’s finding of a “substantial evidentiary and legal basis for 
plaintiffs’ claim.”
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cases over-litigated, and, most importantly, would provide all parties and potential parties with 
notice of the threshold requirements for obtaining a structural consent decree.  
A related issue facing litigants and courts is the sort of remedies that may be mandated 
through a consent decree.  While a detailed examination of available remedies is beyond the 
scope of this article, a few notes here may provide some guidance.  First, in formulating 
remedies to a consent decree, the parties must enjoy at least as broad discretion as the district 
court would have following trial.  This includes the expansive remedial power of the federal 
courts to effectively cure constitutional violations and restore victims to their positions before the 
violations.63
The difficult question is whether the parties may agree to a remedy that the district court 
could not have ordered following an adjudication on the merits.  In Local Number 93, 
International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, the Supreme Court answered with 
a resounding yes, noting that “a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent 
decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have ordered after 
a trial.”64  In Firefighters, the district court was clearly prohibited by §706(g) of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 from entering an “order” which mandated a race-conscious remedy, yet 
a race-conscious remedy is exactly what the parties agreed to and exactly what the district court 
entered in the consent decree.  Although the district court entered a consent decree that contained 
a remedy the court could not have ordered, the Supreme Court upheld the consent decree holding 
63
 See Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).  See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 
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that consent decrees are not included among the “orders” referred to in § 706(g) because “the 
voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most fundamental characteristic.”65
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 
noting, “we have no doubt that, to save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of 
litigation, petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional 
violation that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires 
(almost any affirmative decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily does that), 
but also more than what a court could have ordered absent the settlement.”66
Notwithstanding this broad power to approve consent decrees, federal courts should be 
wary of consent decrees which mandate a remedy the court itself could not have ordered.  First, 
courts should be hesitant to infringe on state autonomy and should be loath to override otherwise 
valid state laws, except to the extent absolutely necessary to vindicate federal rights.67  Second, 
the need to guard against disingenuous litigation is seemingly more acute where the defendants 
agree to do more than constitutionally mandated.   
65
 Id. at 521.
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